THREAT PERCEPTION TOWARD IMMIGRANTS IN SWEDEN A COMPARISON PRE- AND POST-MIGRATION CRISIS by Höglund, Klara Ingrid
THREAT PERCEPTION TOWARD IMMIGRANTS IN SWEDEN 
A COMPARISON PRE- AND POST-MIGRATION CRISIS 
 
 
Klara Ingrid Höglund  
 
 
A thesis submitted to the faculty at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts 
































Klara Ingrid Höglund 





Klara Ingrid Höglund: Threat Perception Toward Immigrants In Sweden 
A comparison pre- and post-migration crisis 
(Under the direction of Gary Marks) 
 
This research study tests a specific case of racial threat theory, namely the threat 
perception effect of the influx of immigrants that followed the European migration crisis in 
2015, and how political ideology moderates this. The general aim of this study is to test 
whether the increased proportion of immigrants in 2015 had any effects on the perceived 
threat level in Sweden. More specifically, I examine how ideology mediates threat perception 
among Swedes by comparing the predictive power of ideology on threat perception – general, 
economic, cultural – before and after the 2015 migration crisis. The results show that the 
increased proportion of the immigrant population had a significant effect on the perceived 
level of threat, and the effect is most substantial among conservative individuals. The study 
concludes that a sharp influx of immigrants does in fact matter for the level of threat 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH APPROACH 
Introduction 
 The aim of this thesis is to examine if and how the migration crisis1 in 2015 impacted 
Swedes’ perceived threat from immigrants and how political ideology moderates this. The 
study contributes theoretically to previous research by developing racial threat theory to 
examine the effects of self-placed political ideology combined with the rapid increase of 
immigrants that followed the migration crisis. Previous studies have researched shifts in 
attitudes toward immigrants pre- and post-migration crises, but they have focused on attitudes 
toward immigrants from a general perspective. What makes this study unique is the 
examination of the threat perception of immigrants in relation to three different types of 
threats: general, economic, and cultural. By differentiating between those threats this study 
also contributes to the debate as to whether immigration fears are about fear of economic 
disadvantages, such as competition in the job market, or loss of cultural dominance. It is also 
important to distinguish different types of threats from a policy perspective. This information 
may be helpful for making informed decisions about how best to move forward with 
campaigns to reduce prejudice against immigrants in Sweden.  
The topic of this thesis is also relevant as the immigration debate is highly politicized 
in Europe. Therefore, it is imperative that this study includes political ideology in the 
                                                        
 
1 In this thesis, the terminology ‘European migration crisis’ and ‘migration crisis,’ refer to the same 
phenomenon, that being the uptick in migration and asylum claims in 2015. More than double the number of 
migrants, 1.3 million, applied for asylum in the EU in 2015, compared to the previous year (Eurostat, 2018). 
The choice to refer to the migration situation in Europe in 2015 as a crisis is not the author’s standpoint on the 
issue, rather the previous literature and the news reports. 
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research. Europe has seen a resurgence of right-wing populist parties who are critical of 
immigration and have gained greater prominence by framing immigrants as a major threat to 
the European way of living. Thus, this study not only asks a general question: How does a 
sharp influx of immigrants affect people's threat perception of immigrants, if at all? It also 
seeks to answer the question: How does the effect of a sharp influx of immigrants affect the 
perceived threat levels of natives across the political spectrum? 
Background 
The European migration crisis of 2015 dramatically increased the number of asylum 
seekers2 in Europe. Much of this can be attributed to unsecured areas and war zones in North 
Africa and the Middle East. In 2015, more than 1 million people applied for asylum in 
Europe, and similar numbers were seen in 2016. The highest per capita number in Europe 
was seen in Sweden, where approximately 163,000 migrants applied for asylum in 2015. 
Sweden alone accepted more asylum seekers in 2015 than France and the UK combined 
(Connor, 2016). The massive influx of refugees coming to Sweden in 2015 was followed by a 
tightening of the refugee policy, which resulted in a decreasing refugee flow to Sweden. In 
parallel, the Swedish public debate on migration became increasingly intense, and migrant 
and refugee policy developed into one of the most hotly debated social issues. By only 
looking at the Swedish national election before and after the migration crisis, one could think 
that the attitudes have become more anti-immigrant since the right-wing populist party, the 
Sweden Democrats3, increased their vote share from 9.67% in 2014 to 15.34% in 2018. Does 
                                                        
 
2 The term asylum seeker is being used frequently throughout the text. The definition is taken from the UNHCR 
Master Glossary of Terms (2006): “An asylum-seeker is an individual who is seeking international protection. 
In countries with individualized procedures, an asylum-seeker is someone whose claim has not yet been finally 
decided on by the country in which he or she has submitted it. Not every asylum-seeker will ultimately be 
recognized as a refugee, but every refugee is initially an asylum-seeker.” 
 
3 The Sweden Democrats has been described as xenophobic, racist and right-wing populist, see for example 
Rydgren (2005) and Nationalencyklopedin (2020). 
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that mean that Swedes, in general, think that immigrants pose a more significant threat to 
them and their society, or is that unique for conservative individuals?  
Methodologically, this study is based on three regression models and uses cross-
section data from the European Social Survey before as well as after the migration crisis to 
examine these issues further. Theoretically, this study uses the racial threat theory as the 
theoretical foundation. Racial threat theory is based on the racial threat hypothesis that 
stipulates that the majority group of society is threatened by the size of one, or several, 
minority group(s) sharing the territory (Blalock, 1967). In other words, the larger the 
minority group is, the more threatened the majority group will be, and the more opposed they 
will be of the minority group(s). The majority group perceives that the minority group 
threatens their dominant social position in society. Theoretically, the logic behind the racial 
threat theory is based on V.O. Key’s (1949) study of Southern politics and his finding on the 
difference between white and black voters in the U.S. South. He found that white voters not 
only turned out at higher rates but also that they voted more conservatively in areas with 
more blacks in the same voting jurisdiction (Key, 1949). He explained the finding by arguing 
that the white voters felt threatened by the black community members, which is the 
underlying logic of the racial threat hypothesis. Empirically, the racial threat hypothesis has 
been evidenced for the relationship between whites and blacks in the U.S.-context (see, for 
example, Smith, 1981; Fossett and Kiecolt, 1989; Glaser, 1994). Support for the theory has 
also been found (fully or partly) in studies from European countries, particularly in countries 
with a history of having many immigrants, for example, Germany, France, and the United 
Kingdom (Semyonov, Raijman, Tov & Schmidt, 2004; Jackson, 1995; Bowyer, 2009). 
However, the association between the size of the minority population and the level of 
perceived threat is uncertain when analyzing other groups and locations with historically 
homogeneous population, such as Sweden. This background sets the general scene for this 
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study: to understand if and how a massive influx of immigrants affects Swedes’ threat 
perceptions from immigrants, and under what conditions. 
Research aim and questions  
Based on this background, the research aim of this thesis is to examine how the 
migration crisis in 2015 impacted Swedes’ perceived threat of immigrants on three grounds: 
general, economic, and cultural. Additionally, this thesis aims to examine if self-placed 
political ideology matters for the level of the perceived threat of immigrants and is especially 
interested in whether the effect is most substantial among conservative individuals. This 
study aims to answer the following questions:  
- Is the threat perception toward immigrants significantly higher among 
Swedes after the 2015 migration crisis?  
- Based on the ideas behind racial threat theory, is the perceived threat 
increase among natives strongest among conservative individuals? 
- Is there any difference between the general, economic and cultural threat 
perceptions?  
Outline 
The thesis continues as follows: First, the literature review is presented and it goes in 
depth about different elements of the racial threat theory. The literature review is followed by 
the theoretical framework which also includes a theoretical model, as well as the hypotheses. 
This is followed by the method section, where all operationalization of concepts to 
measurement are clarified, and the variables are carefully explained. The method section is 
followed by a presentation of the results. The sixth section contains a discussion of the results 
from the regression models, which are also analyzed empirically. Finally, conclusions are 
drawn in the final section, along with suggestions for further research. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Introduction 
The literature review will focus on the major themes that repeatedly emerge 
throughout the literature. These themes are (1) how people react to people of a different 
ethnic or cultural group, (2) the dynamics between the majority and minority groups in 
society, (3) how a minority group can pose different kinds of threats to the majority group, 
(4) the relationship between attitudes on immigrants and political ideology on the traditional 
right/left-wing scale. Although the literature presents these themes in a variety of contexts, 
this paper will chiefly focus on the racial threat theory, other previous research of theoretical 
interest, and finally, ways to conceptualize political ideology.  
Racial Threat Theory 
Several scholars have attempted to explain people’s attitudes toward immigration and 
immigrants. Many theories in the field that are used to explain xenophobia, anti-immigration 
attitudes and support for radical right-wing parties are based on racial threat theory (also 
referred to as minority group threat theory and group threat theory) (Bohman & Hjerm, 
2014). According to the theory, negative attitudes toward immigrants can be explained by the 
fact that the in-group (the native population) perceive the out-group (ethnic minorities and 
immigrants) as a threat to their position in society. As mentioned in the background, the 
theory was initially created by V.O. Key (1949) in his study of Southern politics, where he 
finds evidence that white voters have a higher turnout and vote more conservative in areas 
with more blacks. Blumer (1958) developed the theory with his work on group position 
theory, which is a paradigm for viewing intergroup relations. Blumer’s idea about relative 
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group positioning and how the in-group fear they will lose cultural or economic dominance is 
what underpins the idea of the racial threat hypothesis. In 1967, Blalock advanced the racial 
threat theory further in his book Toward a theory of minority-group relations. In broad terms, 
it is a theory that explains how people react with uncertainty to people of a different group. 
Blalock (1967) argues that if a racial and ethnic minority group increases, members of the 
majority group perceive a growing threat.  
The perceived threat can be divided into different sub-threats, among those sub-
threats this study will focus on the economic and cultural threats4. The economic threat is 
rooted in the higher competition for jobs, housing, social benefits, and other economic 
resources that the growing minority group potentially acquires. Members of the majority 
group perceive a growing threat due to the risk of losing economic well-being and dominance 
(Blalock, 1967). More specifically, the economic threat assumes that people’s attitudes to 
immigrants are primarily based on economic material self-interest. The economic threat can 
be divided into two models, which focus on different types of economic self-interest: Labor 
market competition and fiscal burden. The labor market competition model, on the one hand, 
assumes that increased immigration contributes to increased competition in the labor market. 
The competition on the labor market can be either through increased competition for jobs or 
the risk of wage dumping. The fiscal burden model, on the other hand, assumes that people 
with immigration-critical attitudes view immigrants as a burden for welfare spending and 
other public finances (Hainmueller & Hopkins 2014:227-229).  
The cultural threat explanation instead has its roots in social psychology and argues 
that the main reason people are opposed to immigration is because immigrants are perceived 
                                                        
 
4 Other sub-threats in the theory are the political threat and the criminal threat. The political threat is based on a 
perceived threat of losing political power and political hegemony (Blalock, 1967) and the criminal threat refers 
to an amplified fear of crime due to the increased presence of the minority group (Wang & Todak, 2018). 
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as a threat to national identity and national culture (Hainmueller & Hopkins 2014:234-235). 
A clear difference between the economic threat and the cultural threat is that cultural threat is 
often symbolic rather than material and is less about how immigrants are perceived to affect 
the individuals themselves and more about how the immigrant group is perceived to affect 
the society (Hainmueller & Hopkins 2014:235). In their study, Hainmueller and Hopkins 
(2014:225) show that immigration attitudes are strongly correlated with cultural threat 
perception rather than economic threat perception in the United States, Canada, and Western 
Europe. They state that “research finds that immigration attitudes are shaped by sociotropic 
concerns about its cultural impacts— and to a lesser extent its economic impacts—on the 
nation as a whole. This pattern of results has held up as scholars have increasingly turned to 
experimental tests, and it holds for the United States, Canada, and Western Europe.” 
(Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014:225). 
The racial threat theory states that as a response to any form of threat from a minority 
group, the majority group is hypothesized to demand intensified social control to maintain 
their dominant standing in the society5 (Blalock, 1967). In adapting this theory to the context 
of this study, the racial threat hypothesis would argue that members of the majority group – 
in this case, Swedes – perceive the relative size of the refugee population as threatening and, 
in turn, take actions to reduce this perceived threat by, for example, voting for an anti-
immigration party. According to Blalock (1967), the relationship between racial threat and 
social control is nonlinear, meaning that change in racial threat does not correspond with 
constant change in social control. This means that the relationship is unpredictable and might 
be virtually absent. 
  
                                                        
 




In the previous section, the background to racial threat theory was introduced. In this 
section, more recent research supporting, as well as contradicting the racial threat theory, will 
be presented. Many scholars have researched attitudes toward immigrants in broad terms and 
their effect on society. As shown in the previous section, some scholars find support for the 
racial threat theory. However, other scholars are more skeptical about the effects of racial 
threat theory and state that greater proximity between different racial groups can overcome 
prejudice between majority and minority group members. This is the basis of contact theory, 
and the effects have been evidenced under certain conditions (Everett, 2013; Dixon, 2006).  
The contact theory was created by Gordon Allport in 1954 when he published the 
book The Nature of Prejudice. The theory proposes that contact between the different groups, 
under certain conditions, should reduce problems such as prejudice and discrimination, and 
lead to better interactions and fewer conflicts between groups (Allport, 1954). Scholars that 
have done prominent work on both contact theory and racial threat theory are Kokkonen, 
Esaiasson and Gilljam. For example, they have studied if ethnic diversity evokes group 
conflict over scarce material resources (Kokkonen, Esaiasson & Gilljam 2010:333). In their 
study, they conclude that frequent interethnic personal contacts do not help Western countries 
overcome the strains associated with migration-based ethnic diversity. These results speak 
against the positive effects of ethnic diversity assumed in the contact theory. In another study, 
Kokkonen, Esaiasson and Gilljam (2015) test ethnic diversity and immigration attitudes by 
looking at social trust. Kokkonen, et al. (2015:280) argue that “ethnic diversity affects social 
trust differently depending on the social units under study and how they interact.” In this 
study they found support for racial threat theory as a better predictor of diversity effects on 
social trust. Another finding from their work was support for racial threat theory as a better 
predictor of diversity effects on social trust where the contact with the minority group is easy 
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to avoid (i.e., in neighborhoods) (Kokkonen, et al., 2015:263). In that same study, the authors 
found support for contact theory as a better predictor of diversity effects on social trust where 
the contact with the minority group is hard to avoid (i.e., workplaces) (Kokkonen, et al., 
2015:263). 
There are also previous studies that are more specifically linked to this research, such 
as studies on how the migration crisis has affected people’s attitudes toward immigrants. For 
example, Mohammed (2019) has researched how the terrorist attacks and the European 
migration crisis affected conservative individuals’ attitudes toward immigrants in France. 
Mohammed (2019:33) concludes that individuals who identify with right-wing parties and 
consider themselves as conservatives hold a generally more critical attitude toward 
immigrants in both 2014 and 2016 compared to individuals who did not identify with right-
wing parties and consider themselves as non-conservatives. These results are not very 
surprising since there is empirical evidence that individuals on the right tend to be more anti-
immigrant compared to individuals on the left (Simmons, Silver, Johnson, Taylor, & Wike 
2018).  
Another recent study that focused on the effects of the migration crisis concerning 
attitudes toward immigrants is Strömbäck and Theorin (2018). In their report, they analyze 
the changes in attitudes to immigration and media effects in Sweden 2014–2016. They 
conclude that Swedes in general have positive attitudes toward immigration and that public 
opinion between 2014 and 2016 was characterized by stability rather than change (Strömbäck 
& Theorin, 2018:8). The results in the research indicate an increasing polarization of attitudes 
and they conclude that the process of polarization might be linked to what kind of media 
reports people consume and how the media portray immigrants (Strömbäck & Theorin, 
2018:8). Like much other research about immigration attitudes, Strömbäck and Theorin 
(2018) have used an index to measure attitudes toward immigration. By doing so it is hard to 
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differentiate between the different kinds of threats that have shaped immigration attitudes. To 
overcome this problem, this specific study has not used an index when measuring attitudes 
toward immigrants. Instead of an index, this study is more nuanced by analyzing the 
perceived threats from a general, economic and cultural perspective.  
Political ideology 
For the purpose of this study it is essential to review the previous literature on 
political ideology. Political ideology, is a central concept in political science and is often used 
to structure political opinions regarding social and political affairs. A traditional way to 
classify political ideology is to use the political left-right spectrum. The political left–right 
spectrum is a system used to characterize different political positions on economic issues and 
the classification was first seen in France after the French revolution (Calhoun, 2002:416). In 
established democracies left is often equated with liberal ideology and right is often equated 
with conservative ideology (Caprara, Vecchione, Schwartz, Schoen, Bain, Silvester, 
2017:391). In other words, the left-wing spectrum is associated with more liberal attributes, 
such as anti-nationalism, multiculturalism, pro-linguistic diversity, anti-religion, 
egalitarianism, and a constrained economy. The reverse is true for the right-wing spectrum, 
which is associated with more conservative attributes, such as nationalism, uniculturalism, 
anti-linguistic diversity, pro-religion, anti-egalitarian, and free economy (Altemeyer, 1988; 
Olsen, 1999).  
Commonly, left-wing politics and right-wing politics are presented as the opposite to 
each other. However, an individual or group can agree on a left-wing stance when it comes to 
one matter and a right-wing stance on another. Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson (2002:967) 
explain the left-right dimension as: “Parties to the right on economic issues tend to 
emphasize a reduction of the economic role of the government; they want lower taxes, less 
regulation, privatization, reduced government spending, and a leaner welfare state that poses 
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fewer burdens on employers. Parties to the left on economic issues want the government to 
retain an active role in the economy.” These dividing lines in the left-right political spectrum 
are common in immigration policy. Conservative individuals are more likely to protect the 
national identity and therefore tend to be more anti-immigrant (Jeong 2013, 1471–1472). 
The left-right dimension is built around economic concerns and lacks explanations for 
social issues. In the last 20 years, issues concerned with lifestyle, environment, cultural 
diversity, nationalism, and immigration have risen. The rise of ‘new’ political concerns 
resulted in the need for a new political dimension, as the left-right dimension did not work 
sufficiently to understand the parties’ positions on these uprising political issues. Many 
scholars have made an effort in explaining the development, and it has been referred to as 
postmaterialist - materialist (Inglehart, 1990), new politics - old politics (Müller-Rommel, 
1989), Green - traditionalist, and Left-libertarian - authoritarian (Kitschelt, 1994). Hooghe, 
Marks, and Wilson (2002:976) have combined the characteristics of ecology, alternative 
politics, and libertarianism and refers to it as the green/alternative/libertarian (GAL) pole. 
The opposite pole includes support for traditional values, opposition to immigration, and 
defense of the national community, this pole is referred to as TAN 
(traditional/authoritarian/nationalism). The dividing line in the GAL/TAN dimension is not 
about distribution policy, but about social and cultural values.  
Due to the critical impact of political ideology, this study will examine if it is a 
correlating variable in the research. A unique setting for this research is that the migration 
crisis is used as a breaking point for the level of threat perception prior, as well as after the 
migration crisis in 2015. Even though racial threat theory has been tested in the European 
context before, this study highlights three unique perspectives: (1) the impact of a rapid 
increase of the proportion of the minority group, (2) attitudes toward immigration based on 
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general, economic and cultural threat perception and (3) the case of Sweden. In the next 
section, the theoretical framework is introduced and explained. 
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CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Introduction 
Based on the literature review it is clear that the central theoretical framework for 
examining whether a massive influx of immigrants in a short period is a determinant of 
people’s perceived threat posed by immigrants is the racial threat theory. This thesis 
traditionally has been employed to explain how a majority group –  in this case, Swedes – 
change their attitudes toward a rapidly increased minority group – in this case, immigrants – 
due to the perceived general, economic and cultural threat the majority group faces from the 
minority group. This study will empirically test the racial threat theory by highlighting threat 
perception from a general, economic and cultural perspective, as well as contribute to the 
body of literature surrounding the theory by adding results from the Swedish case. 
Additionally, this thesis will develop the theory by testing the effects of political ideology 
combined with the rapid increase of immigrants, that followed the migration crisis. 
Furthermore, Sweden is a specifically compelling case as it has historically been a culturally 
homogeneous nation with relatively low level of immigration; therefore, the rapid change that 
followed the migration crisis is what makes the case so interesting. From the basis of the 
racial threat theory, the theoretical framework of this study determines that the fast influx of 




The underlying mechanisms behind racial threat theory suggest that higher exposure 
to immigrants increases the threat perception toward immigrants. This study tests if political 
ideology is interacting in shaping threat perception outcomes. Based on the racial threat 
theory, the expectations are that the perceived threat would increase after the migration crisis. 
Furthermore, it is expected that the more to the right someone’s ideological self-placement is, 
the stronger the effect would be. That is visualized in the model below. 
 










The research question of this study is twofold and asks if there is a higher threat 
perception among Swedes after the European migration crisis in 2015 and specifically if the 
effect is stronger for conservative individuals. Therefore, two hypotheses are presented. 
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H1: Individuals exposed to the increased proportion of immigrants that followed the EU 
migration crisis will be more likely to perceive immigrants as threatening.  
H2: The relationship between higher immigrant exposure and threat perception will be 
stronger among conservative individuals. 
To get a broader picture of the issue, the thesis will also explore differences between 
the general, economic and cultural threat perception. Hence, threat perception will further be 
examined by type. The study is more exploratory along these lines because there is limited 
empirical work on the effect of threat by type, particularly in Sweden. 
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CHAPTER 4: METHOD AND DATA 
Introduction 
 The method used in this study is statistical analysis, more specifically, a linear 
regression analysis (OLS). The data analysis computer software used is Stata 16. Briefly, this 
statistical method means that two or more independent variables are used to explain effects 
on the dependent variable. The regression analysis is used to produce results for general, 
economic, and cultural threat perceptions toward immigrants before and after the migration 
crisis. This has been done to examine if there has been a change in threat perception due to 
the higher exposure to immigrants, that followed the migration crisis, or not. In the next 
section, the case selection is explained and motivated. 
Case selection 
 It is relevant to examine whether the intensification of the number of immigrants has 
had consequences on the level of threat perception toward immigrants. Due to the wide-
ranging scope of this topic, only the results from one country will be examined. The choice to 
use Sweden as a case for this study is based on the high number of immigrants who sought 
asylum in Sweden during the migration crisis in 2015. Sweden is also a relevant country to 
research as it can serve as a proxy for a progressive and democratically stable state with a 
history of social inclusion.  
We know that the migration crisis took place in and around the year of 2015, but to 
isolate the effect from it, we also need to exclude other possible large-scale social processes 
that possibly could affect social stability, change, and threat perception. This thesis argues 
that other macro-level factors except for the number of asylum seekers seem to be relatively 
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similar between 2012 and 2016 or have improved. That would mean that the sharp rise of 
immigrants coming to Sweden in 2014-2015 made a perceptible difference and that we can 
isolate the effect of it. According to Kokkonen, Esaiasson, and Gilljam (2015:293), two of 
these essential macro-level factors to elaborate on are economic change and unemployment 
rates. Both of these are factors that have been used extensively in previous studies on the 
perceived threat. Economic change can easily be measured in the annual percentage growth 
rate of GDP. In 2012 the annual GDP growth in Sweden was -0.6%, and in 2016 that 
percentage increased to 2.4% (World Bank, 2020). The second possible macro-level factor is 
the unemployment rate in Sweden. The unemployment rate decreased from 8% in 2012 to 
6.9% in 2016 (SCB, 2020). Between 2012 and 2016 it is clear that the economy improved 
and the unemployment rate declined. This data indicates that Swedes’, if anything, should 
feel less threatened. Another factor to take into consideration when isolating the effect of the 
increased level of immigrants is if any electoral changes happened between 2012 and 2016. 
In 2014, two elections were held. In May, the European Parliament election was held and in 
September the general election to the Riksdag, alongside elections for the 21 county councils, 
and 290 municipal assemblies, were held. This study focuses on the national context, and on 
the national level, the results for the parties were as follow:  
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TABLE 1. Election results in Sweden 2014 (change from the 2010 election in 
parentheses) 
Party Percentage of votes  Mandates  
Social Democratic Party 31.0 (+0,3) 113 (+1) 
Moderate Party 23.3 (-6,8) 84 (-23) 
Sweden Democrats 12.9 (+7,3) 49 (+29) 
Green Party 6.9 (-0,4) 25 (±0) 
Centre Party 6.1 (-0,5) 22 (-1) 
Left Party 5.7 (+0,1) 21 (+2) 
Liberals 5.4 (-1,7) 19 (-5) 
Christian Democrats 4.6 (-1,0) 16 (-3) 
           Source: SVT, 2014 
 
The Moderates lost a relatively large number of voters to the Social Democrats and 
the Sweden Democrats between the 2010 and 2014 elections. The loss of the Liberals was 
proportionally equal to the loss of the Moderates; the other parties have more consistent 
results. However, the Swedish Democrats succeed best with their election results (Hinnfors & 
Sundström, 2015:131-132). The Sweden Democrats more than doubled their electoral 
support and became the third-largest party in the parliament, and their most prominent 
question was, and is still, the one about immigration. A similar result was seen in the 
European Parliament election in 2014. The Sweden Democrats rose from 3.27% in 2009 to 
9.67% in 2014, which was the most significant increase of all parties (+6.40%). Similar to the 
national election, the Moderates decreased by 5.18%, from 18.83% in 2009 to 13.65% in 
2014 (Valmyndigheten, 2014). The rise of the Sweden Democrats in 2014 could have 
increased threat perception in 2016, in addition to the migrant influx. Racial threat theory 
predicts that this would, in fact, lead to the increased salience of migrant threat among the 
native population, and this thesis considers it to be part of the expected outcomes. 
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This thesis will, however, evaluate that by looking at the interaction between survey 
timepoint and political ideology. To provide a nuanced picture of the number of asylum 
seekers, the figure below presents the numbers between January 2013 to November 2018, by 
month, to cover the statistics before as well as after the migration crisis in 2015.   
As mentioned in the introduction of this thesis, the migration influx peaked in 2015, 
with almost 163,000 asylum seekers in one year. In 2012 and 2013, the number of asylum 
seekers was approximately 44,000 and 54,000, respectively. An increase can be seen already 
in 2014 with around 81,000 asylum seekers, and in 2015 the number of asylum seekers is at 
its peak with 163,000 asylum seekers in total, and most of them coming from June - 
December 2015. A drastic decrease can be seen in early 2016, with around 29,000 asylum 
seekers in total that year, and this number continued to decrease slightly in 2017 and 2018. 
For an illustrative chart of this, see figure two on the next page. From this case selection, we 
see that the number of immigrants coming to Sweden in 2015 is the most considerable 
societal change between 2012-2016.  
FIGURE 2. Number of asylum seekers in 2013–2018, per month 
 
Source: Migrationsinfo, 2019 
Data 
In this section, I am going to discuss how I have operationalized my key factors of 
interest: perceived threat perception, higher exposure to immigrants, and political ideology. I 
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also operationalize the additional variables that I am controlling for: age, gender, level of 
education, and domicile (urban/rural). The data I have used is from the European Social 
Survey (ESS), and in order to analyze changes in the threat perception before and after the 
migration crisis, the data is limited to ESS round six (2012) and ESS round eight (2016). The 
idea is to analyze data material, which is close to the migration crisis peak in 2015. That 
makes the time frame short, and by using a short time frame, the effects of the migration 
crisis are easier to isolate in the study. Based on the recommendation from the ESS weighting 
guide, the ESS design weights have been included in the research. The design weights are 
estimated as the inverse of the inclusion probabilities. Because this study is based on two 
cross-sections of data, instead of panel data or longitudinal data6, causal claims about how 
particular individuals change their opinion pre- and post-migration crisis cannot be made. It 
is important to note that, methodologically, the results are talking about group mindset 
changes and not a particular individual’s mindset changes. 
Dependent variables 
The ESS asks respondents different kinds of questions related to statements that 
describe some possible consequences of the inflow of immigrants. In this study, the measure 
of threat perception is operationalized by three variables: general threat perception, economic 
threat perception, and cultural threat perception. The concept of general threat perception is 
operationalized by using the question in ESS asking if the respondent thinks immigrants 
make Sweden a worse or better place to live. If the respondent thinks immigrants make 
Sweden a worse place to live, that respondent has been coded as having high threat 
perception. The opposite applies if the respondent thinks immigrants make Sweden a better 
                                                        
 
6 Panel data or longitudinal data are multi-dimensional data involving measurements over multiple time periods 
for the same individuals (Fitzmaurice, Laird, Ware, 2004:2). One could argue that the optimal type of data to 
use in this study would be panel data; however, no panel data on the specific topic and case have been available, 
and therefore, the European Social Survey data suits the case of this thesis the best.  
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place to live, then the respondent has been coded as having low threat perception. The 
answers are coded in a zero to ten-point scale, and then they are recoded so that higher values 
indicate a greater degree of perceived threat. The same logic goes for economic and cultural 
threat perception, as shown in table two. The general threat perception is more generic in its 
nature and is included in the study to give a sense of the more general opinion and how it has 
changed pre- and post-migration crisis. The economic and cultural threat perception 
outcomes are more specific and will be useful to differentiate between underlying 
mechanisms that shape immigration-attitudes. 
TABLE 2. Summary of the dependent variables 






worse or better 
place to live 
Is Sweden made a worse 
or a better place to live by 
people coming to live here 
from other countries? 
0-10 
0 Worse place to 
live 
10 Better place 
to live 
0-10 
0 Low threat 
perception  






bad or good 
for country’s 
economy 
Would you say it is 
generally bad or good for 
Sweden’s economy that 
people come to live here 
from other countries? 
0-10 
0 Bad for the 
economy 
10 Good for the 
economy 
0-10 
0 Low threat 
perception  










Would you say that 
Sweden’s cultural life is 
generally undermined or 
enriched by people 
coming to live here from 
other countries? 
0-10 
0 Cultural life 
undermined 
10 Cultural life 
enriched 
0-10 
0 Low threat 
perception  
10 High threat 
perception  
 
TABLE 3. Summary statistics of the dependent variables 
Variable  N Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max  Skewness  Kurtosis 
General threat 
perception 
3,089  3.65  2.18  0  10 0.33 2.83 
Economic threat 
perception 
3,089   4.31 2.25 0 10 0.30 2.78 
Cultural threat 
perception 
3,089  3.03 2.26 0 10 0.68 3.12 
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Overall, the summary statistics of the three dependent variables in table three show 
that respondents have a slightly positive, rather than negative, view on how immigration 
affects Sweden. All of the mean values are below a five, and a majority, for example, agrees 
that the cultural life enriches by immigrants and that the economy benefits from immigration. 
This, in turn, generates a lower threat perception. At the same time, there is a minority who 
have a more negative view of how immigrants affect society, and these respondents have a 
higher perceived threat of immigrants.  
The mean for general threat perception is 3.7 and the distribution is skewed to the 
right, meaning that most of the respondents are on the less threatened end of the distribution7. 
This distribution implies that the proportion of respondents who perceive a lower general 
threat from immigrants is bigger compared to the proportion of respondents who perceive a 
higher threat. This means that it is more common to think that immigrants make Sweden a 
better place to live in than it is to think that immigrants make Sweden a worse place. This is 
the same trend as Strömbäck & Theorin (2018) present in their report.  
For the economic threat perception, the mean is 4.3, which is the highest mean of the 
three dependent variables. The distribution is also skewed to the right; however, compared to 
the general threat perception, the distribution is more normally distributed.  
For the cultural threat perception, the mean is 3.0, which is the lowest mean of the 
thee outcome variables. The respondents are on the less threatened end of the distribution, 
indicating that the cultural threat perception is generally lower in terms of cultural issues. The 
distribution for cultural threat perception is also positively skewed.  
  
                                                        
 
7 See Appendix 1 for histograms.  
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Independent variables of theoretical interest 
 In order to operationalize higher exposure to immigrants, I work with a year variable 
that indicates the year that respondents took the survey. The years in the year variable are 
relevant because they are the years closest in terms of before and after the migration crisis in 
2015. This is coded as a dummy variable, and 2012 is the reference year and captures those 
respondents that were surveyed prior to the migration crisis. All respondents surveyed this 
year are coded as 0. The year representing the time respondents were surveyed after the 
migration crisis is 2016. This is operationalized as capturing the respondents with the higher, 
post-crisis, exposure to immigrants. All respondents surveyed this year are coded as 1.  
The second independent variable of theoretical interest is political ideology, which is 
operationalized by self-placement on the left-right political spectrum. The question asked to 
the respondents was: “In politics, people sometimes talk of ‘left’ and ‘right’. Using this card, 
where would you place yourself on this scale, where 0 means the left and 10 means the 
right?” A one-unit change in the ideological self-placement variable is a one-step change in 
the scale running from zero (left) to ten (right).  
TABLE 4. Summary statistics of the independent variables of theoretical interest 
Year  Numeric Freq.  Percentage 
2012 0 1,681     54.42   
2016 1 1,408    45.58  
Total  3,089   100.00  
 




3,089 5.27 2.25   0  10 
 
Table four displays the summary statistics of the two independent variables of 
theoretical interest the mean for political ideology is 5.3, which is almost in the middle of the 
 24 
left and right and common for these types of variables. There are some implications with 
using self-placing on the left–right scale and some people might say that it is better to look at 
what party the respondent voted for in the last election. Caprara, et al. (2017:392) address 
that: “Self identifying along a unique ideological dimension may satisfy people’s needs of 
social inclusion and belonging, despite the diversity of contents that can be traced to the 
opposite poles of that dimension across polities”. However, the same article concludes that 
“ideology is a strong predictor of voting in most countries” (Caprara, et al. (2017:401). Based 
on this reasoning, I have decided to use ideological self-placement as that continues to be an 
important organizer of political ideology.  
Interaction effect 
To test if an interaction effect arises when considering the relationship between the 
year variable and the variable for ideological self-placement, an interaction variable has been 
produced. The interaction variable is the product of the year variable times ideological self-
placement. The interaction variable describes the situation in which the effect of the year 
variable on the outcome variable depends on the state of self-placed political ideology. Using 
an interaction variable allows us to not only test if the effect of higher exposure to 
immigrants after the migration crisis exists overall, but also to test if the effect of the year 
variable depends on the level of ideological self-placement. By using the interaction variable, 
we are able to examine the impact of political ideology on the perceived threat from 
immigration (visualized in the model in figure 1). 
Control variables 
Along with the year variable and the variable for ideological self-placement, several 
individual characteristics are included as control variables in the research: age, gender, level 
of education, and urban/rural. The first control variable is controlling for age. It is an interval 
variable, and the ages run from 15-96. The mean of the respondents’ age is 50 years old. The 
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effect of age on anti-immigrant attitudes has been demonstrated in some of the previous 
research (Hjerm 2007:1263), and it seems like older people generally show higher levels of 
anti-immigrant attitudes. 
The second control variable is gender. That is a nominal variable, coded as 1 for male 
and 2 for female. That makes the reference category male. Previous researchers have 
different explanations on the gender perspective. While some argue that gender has a 
significant effect on anti-immigrant attitudes, others state that gender is not an essential factor 
for explaining on anti-immigrant attitudes (Hjerm 2007:1263). The reasons behind the effects 
of age and gender that have been discussed by other scholars are interesting; however, the 
underlying reasons behind it are beyond the scope of this study. 
The third control variable is the level of education, which is operationalized by the 
question ‘What is the highest level of education you have successfully completed?’ and is 
coded in five categories running from one, representing ‘Less than lower secondary 
education’ to five, representing ‘Tertiary education completed’. The mean was 3.553 after all 
missing values were deleted. Previous research shows that education has a positive effect on 
anti-immigrant attitudes, and the effect of level of education is often explained by the 
liberalizing effect of education (Hjerm 2007:1263).  
The fourth control variable is testing the influence of the rural and urban 
environments of the respondents. The domicile perspective is common for several types of 
political analysis and tells us if it matters if the respondent lives in a rural or urban area. The 
original variable was labeled as “Domicile, respondent’s description” and the available 
response options, accounted for in this research, were: big city, suburbs or outskirts of a big 
city, town or small city, country village, farm or home in the countryside. In this research, the 
responses for big cities and suburbs or outskirts of big cities have been coded as “Urban” and 
the other alternatives have been coded as “Rural”. The options refusal/do not know/no have 
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been re-coded as missing and have not been accounted for in the research. For summary 
statistics of the control variable, see table five below. 
TABLE 5. Summary statistics of the control variables 
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CHAPTER 5: RESULTS 
Introduction 
In this section, the results of the study will be presented and interpreted with the help 
of tables that include all variables of theoretical interest. It should be clarified that in this 
section, the results will be presented for the three outcome variables in three separate tables 
for general, economic, and cultural threat perception. In addition, predictive margins8 and 
average marginal effects9 are being presented for all three outcome variables, respectively. 
The focus in the results section will be on examining whether the year in which the 
respondent answered the survey (before or after the migration crisis) plays a part in the 
perceived threat and if the relationship is stronger among conservative individuals. In 
addition, the effects from the control variables are being described and interpreted with a 
focus on the significance, and the variance explained. The results will be presented 
objectively in this section and will be further discussed in the following chapter with 
connections made to the hypotheses and theory.
                                                        
 
8 Predictive margins are a way to show the average marginal effect of a variable. More specifically it is the 
average of predicted changes in fitted values for one unit change in X (UCLA, 2010). 
9 An alternative way to view the average marginal effect is as a graph that includes the predicted probabilities 
along with the confidence interval (UCLA, 2010).  
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Results for General Threat Perception 
TABLE 6. Regression of General Threat Perception (N=3,089) 




















  0.099*** 
(0.033) 


























Adjusted R2 0.018  0.089  0.091 
Note: *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 *p<0.1 
All standard errors in parentheses 
 
 
Table six displays the results in estimating general threat perception. Model one 
includes the two most important independent variables: the year variable and the ideological 
self-placement variable. In model two, the control variables were added, and in model three, 
the interaction effect was added. The interaction effect is statistically significant in model 
three, and the same applies to the year variable and the ideological self-placement variable. 
Therefore, model three, the final model, is the model that will be interpreted to understand 
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the outcome further. Age is not significant, meaning that being older or being younger does 
not affect your general threat perception, when controlling for everything else in the model 
and holding that constant. Females have a lower threat perception by 0.138, compared to 
males. Even though there is a significant gender difference, it is not a substantially important 
difference. The education variable shows that the higher education someone has, the less 
generally threatened they are predicted to be by the presence of immigrants. As education 
goes up a category, the threat perception goes down by approximately half a point. The same 
goes for the control for metropolitanism, being in an urban area is lowering the threat 
perception by 0.159. The variables explained above are possible to interpret directly from the 
regression model. However, the coefficients included in the interaction effect cannot be 
interpreted as independent of each other. The reason for that is because it is impossible to 
hold the interaction effect constant when changing the year. Therefore, predicted margins 
were obtained and are presented in table seven, below, and in a graph on the next page. 
TABLE 7. Predicted General Threat Perception, by years and ideological self-
placement 
Note: *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 *p<0.1 




2012 2016 Difference 
3 3.373*** (0.073) 3.302*** (0.077) 0.071 
5 3.554*** (0.051) 3.681*** (0.056) -0.127* 
7 3.734*** (0.064) 4.060*** (0.070) -0.326** 
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FIGURE 3. Graph of predicted values of General Threat Perception, with 95% CIs 
 
 
Table seven displays predicted general threat perception values by years and when 
ideological self-placement is three (more to the left), five (moderate), and seven (more to the 
right). Table seven shows that the more conservative you are, in both years, there higher 
predicted levels of general threat perception you have. That same patterns apply for both 
2012 and 2016; however, the differences are a bit stronger in 2016, meaning that the threat 
perception went up a little bit more in 2016. The interaction effect indicates that the 
ideological self-placement variable is interacting with the year variable. When considering if 
the difference between the years is significant or not, I have subtracted the predicted margins 
for 2012 with the predicted margins for 2016, and then I have done a test to see if the 
difference is significant. People to the left have a lower general threat perception, and people 
on the right, have a significantly higher threat perception in 2016 compared to 2012. This is 
the nature of the interaction, and it looks like people who have placed themselves between 
zero and three on the left-right self-placement scale have a lower threat perception in 2012 
compared to 2016. It also looks like people who placed themselves between four and ten 
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have higher threat perceptions in 2016 compared to 2012. However, the difference is not 
significantly different on the 95% confidence interval until the value of ideological self-
placement is seven (more to the right). 
Figure three visualizes the results from table seven in a graph with all values of 
ideological self-placement. It is clear that when ideological self-placement is seven or higher, 
the confidence intervals are not overlapping. That is how to know if the differences are 
significantly different or not. When ideological self-placement is below seven, there is no 
significant difference between the general threat perception between 2012 and 2016. This 
means that the predicted general threat perception is significantly higher before the migration 
crisis compared to after the migration crisis for conservative respondents who place 
themselves at seven or higher on the ideological self-placement variable. The adjusted R 
square is low, so there must be additional factors that are predicting general threat perception 
that are not in this model, or this may be noise. 
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Results for Economic Threat Perception 
TABLE 8. Regression of Economic Threat Perception (N=3,089) 
*** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 *p<0.1 
All standard errors in parentheses   
 
 
Table eight displays the results in estimating economic threat perception. Model one 
includes the two most important independent variables: the year variable and the ideological 
self-placement variable. In model two, the control variables were added, and in model three, 
the interaction effect was added. The interaction effect is statistically significant in model 
three, and the same applies to the year variable and the ideological self-placement variable. 
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Adjusted R2 0.011 0.085 0.088 
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Therefore, model three, the final model, is the model that will be interpreted to understand 
the outcome further. Age is not significant, meaning that being older or being younger does 
not affect the economic threat perception, controlling for everything else in the model and 
holding that constant. Neither is there a significant gender effect for the economic threat 
perception. The education variable shows that the higher education someone has, the less 
economically threatened they are predicted to be by the presence of immigrants. As education 
goes up a category, the threat perception goes down by approximately half a point, the same 
pattern as we could see for general threat perception. The effect of living in an urban area is 
lowering the threat perception by 0.251, which is a stronger effect than we could see for the 
general threat perception. To interpret the effects from the variables included in the 
interaction effect, predicted margins were obtained and are presented in table nine, below, 
and in a graph on the next page. 




2012 2016 Difference 
3 4.227*** (0.076) 3.855*** (0.080) 0.372*** 
5 4.336*** (0.053) 4.215*** (0.058) 0.121 
7 4.445*** (0.066) 4.576*** (0.073) -0.131 
Note: *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 *p<0.1 
All standard errors in parentheses 
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FIGURE 4. Graph of predicted values of Economic Threat Perception, with 95% CIs 
 
 
Table nine is showing predicted economic threat perception values by years and when 
ideological self-placement is three (more to the left), five (moderate), and seven (more to the 
right). Table nine shows that more conservative you are, in both years, the higher the 
predicted levels of economic threat perception you have. That same patterns apply for both 
2012 and 2016; however, the differences are a bit stronger in 2016, meaning that the threat 
perception went up a little bit more in 2016. That is the same pattern we could see in table 
seven, for the general threat perception.  
The interaction effect indicates that the ideological self-placement variable is 
interacting with the year variable. People who placed themselves 0-5 (left-moderate) have a 
lower threat perception in 2016 than they had in 2012, meaning that their economic threat 
perception decreased after the migration crisis. Respondents who placed themselves as six 
(moderate leaning toward the right) on the left-right ideological self-placement scale have the 
same predicted economic threat perception in 2012 and 2016. People who placed themselves 
between seven and ten (more to the right) have a higher threat perception in 2016 compared 
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to 2012. However, the difference is only significantly different, on the 95% confidence 
interval, when ideological self-placement is between zero and three. That is also visualized in 
graph two; when ideological self-placement is three or below the confidence intervals are not 
overlapping, meaning that the differences are significantly different. When ideological self-
placement is higher than three, there is no significant difference between the economic threat 
perception pre- and post-migration crisis. Same as for the general threat perception, the 
adjusted R square is relatively low, so there must be additional factors that are predicting 
economic threat perception that not in this model, or it can be noise.  
Results for Cultural Threat Perception 
TABLE 10. Regression of Cultural Threat Perception (N=3,089) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
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(0.034) 


























Adjusted R2 0.015  0.103 0.104 
*** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 *p<0.1 
All standard errors in parentheses 
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Table ten displays the results in estimating general threat perception. Model one 
includes the two most important independent variables: the year variable and the ideological 
self-placement variable. In model two, the control variables were added, and in model three, 
the interaction effect was added. The interaction effect is statistically significant in model 
three, and so is the ideological self-placement variable. The year variable is not statistically 
significant in model three, but since the interaction effect is statistically significant, that is the 
final model that I will be interpreting in this regression analysis. Age is not significant, 
meaning that being older or being younger does not affect the cultural threat perception. 
There is a statistically significant gender effect for the cultural threat perception, showing that 
females perceive a lower cultural threat by 0.380, compared to males. The same trend as for 
the general and the economic treat perception there is a statistically significant education 
effect showing that the higher education someone has, the less culturally threatened they are 
predicted to be by the presence of immigrants. The effect of living in an urban area is not 
statistically significant for the cultural threat. To interpret the effects from the variables 
included in the interaction effect, predicted margins were obtained and are presented in the 
table and graph below. 




2012 2016 Difference 
3 2.745*** (0.076) 2.723*** (0.080) 0.022 
5 2.957*** (0.053) 3.049*** (0.058) -0.092 
7 3.168*** (0.066) 3.375*** (0.073) -0.207** 
Note: *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 *p<0.1 
All standard errors in parentheses 
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Table eleven is showing predicted cultural threat perception values by years and when 
ideological self-placement is three (more to the left), five (moderate), and seven (more to the 
right). Table eleven shows that more conservative you are, in both years, there higher 
predicted levels of cultural threat perception you have. That same patterns apply for both 
2012 and 2016; however, the differences are a bit stronger in 2016, meaning that the threat 
perception went up a little bit more in 2016. This is a similar pattern we could see in tables 
seven and nine for the general and economic threat perception.  
The interaction effect indicates that the ideological self-placement variable is 
interacting with the year variable. Descriptively, those who placed themselves between zero 
and three (left-leaning respondents) on the left-right ideological self-placement scale have a 
slightly lower predicted perceived cultural threat in 2016, compared to 2012. The opposite 
goes for those who placed themselves four and above; the perceived cultural threat is 
predicted to be higher in 2016, compared to 2012. However, the difference is not statistically 
significant on the 95% confidence interval for any of the values on the ideological self-
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placement scale. The lack of statistical significance is also visualized in graph three; all the 
confidence intervals are overlapping on the 95% confidence interval level, meaning that the 
differences are not significantly different. Same as for the general and economic threat 
perception, the adjusted R square is relatively low in the regression model, so there must be 
additional factors that are predicting general threat perception that is not in this model, or it 
can be noise. 
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CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION 
Overall, the results show that the more conservative someone is, the higher threat 
perception they have. This applies for all three types of threat perception (general, economic, 
and cultural), and the effect is true for both before as well as after the migration crisis. 
Considering the first hypothesis: Individuals exposed to the increased proportion of 
immigrants that followed the EU migration crisis will be more likely to perceive immigrants 
as threatening, the results from this study partly support the first hypothesis. For the general 
threat perception, there is a statistically significant higher threat among 2016 conservatives 
than the average conservative respondent in 2012. In other words, post-migration crisis 
conservatives were more likely to perceive a general threat from immigrants than other 
political groups were. Descriptively, this is true for the economic and cultural threat 
perception as well, but the difference is not statistically significant on the 95% confidence 
interval.  
The study supports the second hypothesis: The relationship between higher immigrant 
exposure and threat perception will be stronger among conservative individuals.  
The relationship between the threat perception and conservatives after the migration crisis 
certainly adds to the racial threat theory over the contact theory. From the results, we can 
easily predict that the more conservative somebody is, the higher threat perception they will 
have. Descriptively, the relationship is accurate for all three types of threat perception.  
However, it is only statistically significant for the general threat perception. Furthermore, the 
results for left-wing individuals are fascinating. For left-wing respondents, the effect of the 
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migration crisis seems to have lowered the threat perception. That finding seems to add to the 
contact theory rather than racial threat theory. However, the difference between the years for 
left wing respondents is only statistically significant for the economic threat perception. 
Another interesting finding is the variances between the three types of threats. The 
economic perceived threat is the type of threat with strongest effect among conservatives 
after the migration crisis. When considering the control variables, it is clear that age does not 
have a statistically significant effect on the level of perceived threat. Gender has a statistically 
significant effect on the general and the cultural threat perception, which is in line with 
previous literature that females have lower threat perception than males. The education 
variable is significant in all three regression models and it recognized that higher education is 
lowering the predicted general, economic, and cultural perceived threats. This is concurrent 
with previous research and indicates that the more education a person has, the less likely they 
will be threatened by things outside of their comfort zone. When controlling for 
metropolitanism, that is statistically significant for general and economic, if someone lives in 
an urban area that is predicted to lower the threat perception.  
Confirming prior research (Jeong, 2013:1471-1472; Mohammed 2019:33), the results 
show that there is an effect of political ideology on threat perception; the more conservative – 
the higher the threat perception. The results were consistent with the hypotheses for the most 
part, and the research supported the racial threat theory, but some effects were stronger than 
others. For example, descriptively, the interaction effect for economic threat perception is 
slightly stronger compared to general and cultural threat perception, but not by much. That 
speaks against Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014:225), who state that cultural values rather 
than economic impacts shape immigration attitudes. However, the results in this study might 
be explained by the unique setting of Sweden, which is generally liberal and open for 
diversity and has a very secular state. Egalitarianism probably plays a part in the Swedish 
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case, and if this study was replicated with another country, the cultural threat might have the 
strongest effect.
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
This paper examines a specific case of racial threat theory, namely if and how the 
migration crisis in 2015 impacted Swedes’ perceived threat from immigrants and how 
political ideology moderates this. The results show that conservative individuals have a 
higher threat perception after the European migration crisis compared to non-conservative 
individuals. For liberal Swedes, the relationship goes in the opposite direction, and liberals 
have a lower threat perception after the migration crisis. The rapid increase of immigrants 
after the European crisis does not seem to explain the perceived threat by itself. However, the 
interaction effect of the year and ideological self-placement seems to be a good predictor of 
how threat perception changes. The general threat perception is used as a cross-section to get 
a sense of the general view on immigrants, and the economic and cultural threat perception is 
used to guide some sort of direction in which threat is the most important. This thesis 
concludes three major things: 
Conclusion 1: Political ideology is an essential explanation for threat perception. The 
more conservative, the higher threat perception, this is the case both pre- and post-migration 
crisis. The effect is more substantial after the migration crisis, which is supported by the 
racial threat theory. The relationship between threat perception and ideology is central, not 
only for conservatives – there is also a relationship on the opposite side of the political 
spectrum. Liberals have a lower threat perception after the migration crisis. This pattern is 
rather supported by contact theory. The political ideology variable in this study is based on 
ideological self-placement on the traditional left-right scale, that is based on economic issues. 
Because of the essential role of political ideology, a future study could benefit from adding 
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the social dimension in the GAL/TAN scale to clarify the importance of political 
ideology further. 
Conclusion 2: Among the three different types of threat perceptions examined in this 
study the economic threat is the strongest threat among conservatives. Future research needs 
to identify how, when, and why economic threat perception matters more for attitude 
formation among conservatives in Sweden. The increased economic fears after the migration 
crisis might be a thing that is unique to Sweden, which is a generally liberal nation and open 
for diversity; additionally, it is a very secular state. The same results might not be found in 
other countries with a stronger religious foundation that could more greatly induce fear that 
an influx of immigrants will undermine the nation’s cultural identity.  
Conclusion 3: The results in this research have the potential to inform politicians and 
officials about how underlying general, economic, and cultural threats shape immigration 
attitudes and can be useful for future policymaking. Among these threats, the economic 
perceived threat is the type of threat with strongest effect among conservatives after the 
migration crisis. Thus, a focus on this threat could be particularly interesting for policy 
makers. However, more research is needed to understand how this is operating. Indeed, 
economic threat can be driven by a concern for more labor market competition or a higher 
fiscal burden. These are possible underlying mechanisms that drive attitudes about 
immigration relative to economic threat. Thus, labor market competition and fiscal burden 
are two specific items for further research to assist policymakers in understanding what 
shapes immigration attitudes relative to this threat. With that specific knowledge, 
policymakers would be enabled to create direct policies to assist in reducing xenophobia, 
prejudices and anti-immigrant attitudes, at least in Sweden. 
This study certainly contributes a unique case with Sweden’s sudden and 
unprecedented increase in immigrants and the comprehensive approach by looking at threat 
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perception from three different perspectives. Sweden’s history of being a homogenous and 
relatively low-immigrant country and the sudden increase of migrants in 2015 makes the 
results fascinating. The hypotheses were partly supported, and the most consistent finding 
was that conservatives became more threatened after the migration crisis, which adds to the 
racial threat theory. A more surprising finding was that liberals became less threatened after 
the migration crisis, and that could be explained by contact theory. This indicates that both 
theories work dynamically with each other, and both theories are needed to understand 
complex behaviors and attitudinal changes and their differences on the political spectrum. 
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APPENDIX 1: HISTOGRAMS 
FIGURE 6. Histogram for General Threat Perception 
 
FIGURE 7. Histogram for Economic Threat Perception 
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